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1. REMOTE CONTROL OF RAILWAY 
LINES 
 Conventionally, the railway traffic is handled 
manually by the local operators at the stations. 
Usually there is a hierarchical operational 
organization above them that consists of 
dispatchers with different roles and 
responsibilities. This staff organizes and optimizes 
the traffic of the entire network. Its role is highly 
important in case of discrepancies of the planned 
schedule (due to the track of rolling stock, wayside 
equipment failures or human errors). The 
dispatchers try to avoid disturbances by forecasting 
train movements, planning and ordering the local 
operators how to control the traffic. These orders 
are executed by handling the following: 
− signalling system (e.g. points, signals, level 
crossings, interlocking, power supply), 
− overhead line system (e.g. power switches, 
grounding), 
− communication system (e.g. data network, 
engine driver radio system), 
− passenger information system (e.g. displays 
and speakers), 
− operations information system (e.g. schedule 
management, moving authorities), 
− wayside vehicle monitoring system (e.g. hot 
box detection, load measuring)  
− alarm system (e.g. infrastructure security, fire 
detection). 
 
At present the railway infrastructure 
management companies are pressed to lower their 
operational costs and improve their effectiveness at 
the same time. In order to achieve these goals, the 
state-of-the-art technologies particularly in 
information and communication technology and in 
control systems are welcome to use in railway 
domain. Although local operators have to handle   
a wide range of systems, in case of small stations 
their workload is not utilized adequately. In 
addition, new technologies are capable of not only 
replacing human resources in certain processes but 
also optimizing traffic flows with sophisticated 
automation. Moreover, they can ensure higher 
safety than former systems. At the highest level of 
automation the local operators of the railway 
stations can be replaced by a remote control system 
that is able to handle all systems listed beforehand. 
This system consists of remote control 
workstations where handling of more stations is 
integrated thus even a whole railway line could be 
controlled remotely from one central place. The 
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workstations are usually installed in an operation 
control centre and each one is responsible for 
specified tasks over specified stations or lines. 
Usually for each task there is a single person 
assigned e.g. for signalling, overhead line 
managing, passenger information purposes. This 
modern form of railway traffic operation is called 
centralised traffic control (CTC). 
This centralised system requires technical 
enlargement and additional devices at the stations. 
Despite expanding the existing equipment with 
further elements, a higher availability is expected. 
It may seem like a contradiction because in case of 
serial systems the higher the complexity, the higher  
the possibility of a failure. For that reason many 
parts of the CTC system are built in a redundant 
way to minimize the duration of downtimes and 
allow all the components to operate 
simultaneously. 
The mentioned features of CTC systems like 
complexity, integrated functionality, availability, 
redundant architecture, are typical for every 
implemented system. Apart from this we must take 
into consideration situations when this system 
incidentally fails. Maintaining the railway traffic 
under such circumstances (no local operators at the 
stations) requires special hardware and software 
composition and regulation by operational rules. 
These aspects are discussed in the following 
section. 
 
2. EMERGENCY SITUATIONS 
From the viewpoint of CTC those events are 
considered emergency situations when the control 
of the railway traffic and the related tasks cannot 
be performed from the operation control centre. 
This partial or total failure can derive from: 
− station devices, 
− centre of the CTC system or 
− communication network between the stations 
and the centre. 
 
These disturbances can cause traffic 
congestions, delays and other serious disruptions in 
the railway traffic. It is necessary to avoid its 
consequences or at least lower the scale of problem 
by prompt intervention. However the fact that there 
are no local operators along the remotely 
controlled lines and some stations are totally 
abandoned makes it difficult to accomplish this 
task. The emergency situations should be treated 
from technical, technological and human aspects in 
order to minimize the duration and the territorial 
scale of the disturbances. 
 
2.1. TECHNICAL ASPECTS 
The emergency situations are triggered by the 
previously listed potential failures considering 
technical aspects. However it is assumed that 
besides these types of failures the voice 
communication between the train personnel and 
the centre remains available. The communication 
channels are independent of the data network; their 
power supply is also independent of the CTC 
system, as uninterruptible power sources are 
commonly and easily applied, while mobile 
devices use batteries. The possibility of the failure 
of the remote control workstations is really slight 
because of the applied redundancy concerning both 
the workstations and the power supply system too. 
The multiple loop architecture of the data network 
makes the loss of more stations or an entire railway 
line also unlikely. Based on the experiences of the 
existing Hungarian CTC systems only one station 
loss is so possible that should be taken into 
consideration in the followings. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Combined fault and event tree for fall-back mode operation. 
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The potential failures and subsystem 
availabilities taken into consideration regarding the 
fall-back mode operation are depicted in a fault 
and event tree (see Figure 1.). From operational 
aspects the failure of the data connection and the 
failure of the remote control workstation can be 
examined together as the consequence of both 
events: the actual state of the traffic and that of the 
wayside elements is not transmitted to the CTC 
personnel. This can be regarded as a critical 
situation, since the computer aided traffic control 
becomes disabled. This is the result of the fault tree 
and the initiation of the event tree. The only way to 
control the railway traffic is to order the train 
personnel by voice communication, as we assume 
that communication remains available. However 
many parts of the CTC system cannot accomplish 
their tasks in this situation, because their 
functionality is partly or totally related to the 
remote control workstation e.g. logging, train 
identification, train controlled route setting, 
automatic passenger information. Note that station 
devices generally are able to continue their work 
properly even in such situations, as their possibility 
of failure is independent on the centre and on the 
data network. 
 
2.1.1. Suitable system architecture 
Based on the general technical aspects 
mentioned before, potential system architecture 
will be described in this section that is able to 
operate under abnormal circumstances too. The 
signalling, operation information and passenger 
information systems will be emphasized, because 
their outage causes immediate effect on railway 
traffic, while the overhead line control, wayside 
monitoring and alarm systems are usually not 
continuously used, so their fall-back mode 
operation is not an essential requirement. The 
structure of a potential CTC system with the 
correspondent human participants, signalling and 
operation information system is depicted in              
Figure 2. 
Considering the technical aspects the figure 
shows the relations between the operation 
information system and the signalling system that 
consists of the remote control workstation and the 
interlocking devices of the stations involved. In 
normal operational this composition ensures high 
level automation in the traffic control due to the 
train controlled route setting. The input of this 
function is the schedule that is determined by the 
allocated train paths. These schedule data are 
transmitted to the operational information system 
and stored in a database. The traffic technologist 
reviews the received schedule, fixes the bugs, if 
there are any, and fits it to the operational 
technology, for example he creates the connection 
options for passenger trains. These disposition 
criteria mean that the conditions of the train 
controlled route setting are on the planning level. 
While the trains run, the CTC-dispatchers and 
the CTC-operators (see section Human aspects) 
can modify this database according to the actual 
traffic situation if necessary. The train numbers are 
assigned to the track occupancies at the remote 
control workstation. This safety related system and 
the information system is strictly separated, 
however the communication between them is 
ensured. The remote control workstation gives the 
actual train positions, while the information system 
sends the route setting orders with the related 
conditions back. The train controlled route setting 
is a built-in function of the remote control 
workstation, practically an interface between the 
information system and the station interlocking, 
which processes and evaluates the route setting 
orders and their conditions. When all requirements 
are fulfilled the route setting order is transmitted to 
the interlocking of the appropriate station. The 
station interlocking executes this route setting as 
usual. This operation is similar to other CTC 
systems applied in Austria and Germany (see [1], 
[2]). 
The potential architecture of the passenger 
information system follows the same as the 
signalling system. The distributed system consists 
of a control computer connected to the remote 
control workstation and speech machines at the 
stations. Although the control computer controls 
the speech machines by sending the train numbers 
and trigger conditions, the speech reported at the 
stations via loudspeakers is stored in the speech 
machines locally. 
Considering the mentioned signalling and 
passenger information systems, a fall-back mode 
operation can be defined, since their operation is 
partially independent of the outage of the CTC 
centre. The executive devices (interlocking and 
speech machine) and the trigger elements (track 
occupancy sensors) operate at the station level. In 
case of the outage of the centre or losing the data 
connection the train detection still works, but the 
train identification by the train number fails, as this 
function is accomplished at the CTC centre. Thus 
the control messages (about the route settings and 
the reported speech) are not transmitted to the 
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stations. However activating the fall-back mode 
operation described in the following section the 
operation of the signalling and passenger 
information systems can be maintained. 
2.1.2. Fall-back mode operation 
The fall-back mode operation means a fixed 
automatic function built in the interlocking, and the 
speech machine that always executes the same 
commands when any train approaches the station, 
as the trains cannot be identified individually. In 
case of the interlocking this function is called 
automatic route setting and depicted in Figure 2. 
Passing a train through the station, handled by this 
function, is performed in two phases (see Figure 
3.). For example, for every train arriving from 
direction A an entry route is set to platform I., and 
then an exit route is set to the direction B (dotted 
arrows). For the trains coming from the opposite 
direction another platform should be appointed for 
passing (dashed arrows). If any condition 
necessary for performing the route setting is 
missing, the process is suspended until it is 
fulfilled. Thus trains incidentally depart from both 
adjacent stations will not cause a deadlock 
situation; moreover this solution enables even train 
crossings to be accomplished at a station out of 
remote control. Both tracks appointed for fall-back 
mode railway traffic should be provided with 
platforms in order to be able to serve passenger 
trains. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Potential route settings in fall-back mode 
operation 
 
In case of junction stations train movements are 
ensured only at one way considering the branch 
line (direction C in Figure 3.). While routes can be 
set from direction C to A (stroked arrows), the exit 
routes of the opposite direction have more 
potential endpoints. Without train identification the 
fixed automatic function cannot find out the 
correct direction. In such cases a potential solution 
is to set the direction used more often as a default 
endpoint, and the trains that might intend to run to 
another direction should be stopped at the previous 
Fig. 2. Potential CTC architecture. 
 
 
TRANSPORT Fall-Back Mode Operation on Remotely... 
 53 
station. Considering larger stations this solution 
would mean significant capacity limit, so it should 
be ensured that the control of the station fallen out 
from remote control is temporary taken over by           
a local operator as fast as possible. Since these 
large stations are usually not totally abandoned, it 
does not seem to be an impracticable requirement. 
The fixed automatic function must work at 
every station in the same way; the only 
configuration parameter is the platform number 
and the main direction in case of junctions. 
Keeping this principle in mind, the CTC personnel 
will always know which route should be set if                 
a train approaching a station has fallen out of 
remote control, and he can notify the train 
personnel about it if necessary. 
For passenger safety reasons, the passenger 
information system should be also maintained in 
course of emergency situations. A potential way is 
to inform the passengers about the railway traffic 
by speech directly from the CTC centre, if the 
communication system is available. Another way 
is to define a fall-back mode operation considering 
the automatic passenger information system. 
Without train identification there is no chance to 
give detailed schedule information to the 
passengers about the trains. Moreover it is also 
impossible to detect whether the approaching train 
is a freight train or a passenger one, and if it is the 
latter whether it is going to stop at the station. The 
primary goal is to draw the passengers’ attention to 
an approaching train by automatic warning speech, 
thus ensuring their safety. It is feasible since track 
occupancies are processed locally, and the 
concerned platform can be also retrieved from the 
automatic route setting function of the 
interlocking. This architecture can be improved by 
enabling the speech machines to inform the 
passengers about the fall-back mode operation and 
let them know that detailed schedule information is 
not available. This can be completed by the ticket 
inspectors if the platforms are equipped with 
communication boxes that allow direct connection 
to the loudspeakers. Note that these boxes are also 
essential to ensure redundant communication on 
remotely controlled lines by enabling the 
connection to the dispatchers’ phone network. 
The defined fall-back modes in signalling and 
passenger information systems allow maintaining 
train traffic on stations fallen out from the remote 
control. A great advantage is that during this mode 
of operation the CTC personnel still knows what 
kind of automatic processes are executed at the 
stations. However this solution can only work 
properly in emergency cases, if the voice 
communication, the interlocking devices at the 
stations and the railway track remain available (see 
Figure 1.). 
Despite all efforts put into fall-back mode 
operation the railway traffic cannot be maintained 
permanently and in case of large stations 
disturbances appear quite soon. Besides starting 
troubleshooting, the handling of station loosed 
connection with the centre should be taken over 
temporary by a local operator. The related 
technical requirement is to ensure local operator 
interface at every interlocking. This HMI can be: 
− a conventional desk (in case of relay 
interlocking), 
− an installed computer (in case of existing 
electronic interlocking or relay interlocking 
equipped with electronic control board) or 
− plugging facility for a portable emergency 
control computer. 
 
The last option is depicted in Figure 2. This 
additional relation of the interlocking system is 
marked with dashed line. Every kind of emergency 
computers should be capable of controlling the 
interlockings at all stations that were defined 
previously. This operating area is only restricted by 
the performance features of the computer; however 
only those interlockings are included that do not 
have local HMI. At larger stations an ordinal HMI 
must be left, because handling them through                   
a portable machine is quite cumbersome due to 
heavy traffic and ergonomic aspects. For security 
reasons the emergency computer must be used 
only for HMI purposes, all kind of media devices 
are forbidden to connect as input device. 
The failure of station devices can occur 
independently of the CTC system. State of 
different types of station devices (e.g. interlocking, 
communication, overhead line and power systems) 
are monitored from the CTC centre. Their failures 
are indicated at the workstations of the CTC centre 
in a similar way as it is implemented at 
conventional stations without remote control. The 
railway traffic can be maintained with safety 
critical signalling commands, however these 
commands cannot be ordered automatically, so the 
train controlled route setting function should be 
disabled in the area of the faulty element. In this 
situation the workload of the CTC-operator 
suddenly increases, in addition it  has to give safety 
critical commands without the supervision of the 
interlocking and including the possibility of human 
error. That is why the fast troubleshooting and 
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appropriate specialist crew re essential. That can be 
ensured by organizing the duty services of the 
troubleshooting personnel. 
 
2.2. TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS 
The procedures to be applied in case of failures 
of station devices have been already discussed. 
However sometimes it is necessary to identify the 
failure locally or inspect the faulty element. As 
there are no local operators, the personnel of trains 
or other railway co-operators should be involved 
depending on the seriousness of the failure. Thus 
the origin of a failure concerning e.g. a track 
occupancy detector, a signal or a point can be 
easily and quickly determined before the 
troubleshooting staff arrives. For example a point 
failure can be eliminated just by removing the 
obstacle from the track. 
The procedures applied in case of the outage of 
CTC centre or data communication, when fall-back 
mode operation is activated, require special 
regulation. The most important restrictive factor at 
junction stations is that the automatic route setting 
function always sets the exit routes to the same 
endpoint from every direction. Thus those trains 
that would pass to another direction have to be 
stopped at the previous remotely controlled station. 
The same procedure should be followed in case of 
those trains that must run on a track different from 
what the automatic function uses or which 
terminates at the station. It usually affects mainly 
freight trains, for example RollendeLandstrasse 
(Ro-La) cargo. 
The most appropriate staff who can take over 
the control of a station fallen out of remote control 
is the signalling or communication troubleshooting 
staff, as these organizations are ready to react 
immediately to unexpected failures (see duty 
services). Usually they arrive firstly at the 
abandoned stations. The takeover of handling                
a station means activating the local HMI described 
in previous section. At this point we have to define 
the limits of roles and responsibilities of the 
participants. Depending of the regulation issued by 
the infrastructure manager company the 
troubleshooting staff can set all potential 
commands on the HMI in compliance with the 
CTC-operator’s orders, or their role can be 
restricted only to normal commands, while safety 
critical commands cannot be performed at all. In 
case of both solutions the troubleshooting staff 
should be trained (and re-trained regularly) about 
the operational rules before they are allowed to 
handle the interlocking. If the failure of the station 
is serious or seems to be long lasting then                       
a temporary operator must be assigned. 
Considering larger stations which are not 
abandoned totally, the temporary operator should 
be selected from the remained staff who can take 
over the control immediately if necessary. 
However the notified temporary operator always 
has to act in compliance with the CTC-operator’s 
order. 
 
2.3. HUMAN ASPECTS 
The roles and responsibilities of the human 
participants should be clarified in case of handling 
a station locally. Under normal circumstances the 
CTC personnel controls the station. At the moment 
the CTC-operator is the person who is responsible 
for a group of stations considering every event that 
occurs there. However responding these events is 
not only his duty. As it is mentioned in the section 
a suitable system architecture and the range of 
CTC functions is assigned to different 
workstations. The CTC-operator is responsible for 
the signalling and operation of information 
systems, in addition collects and distributes 
information from other workstations concerning 
his stations. Generally it is quite rare that a CTC-
operator gives commands through the remote 
control workstation, instead he/she handles the 
operation information system, plans the train 
traffic about 1-2 hours forward, while the train 
controlled route setting function issues the 
effective commands. 
The CTC-dispatcher usually carries out the 
operational planning. It means that he deals with 
the track restrictions and trackside works. He logs 
these events into the operation information system, 
and communicates with the maintenance staff, if 
necessary. Through the operational information 
systems or by speech they inform the CTC-
operators and the train personnel about every 
restriction. With this cooperation between the 
participants the railway traffic can be organized 
efficiently under normal circumstances. 
In course of emergency situations temporary 
operators are required immediately at the stations 
that have fallen out of remote control. This demand 
on human resource can be satisfied by the 
troubleshooting personnel or by the railway staff 
remaining at the station. Whichever is chosen, the 
potential temporary operators should be trained 
about the operational rules. Even though they do 
not control the railway traffic effectively, they can 
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be logically considered as a transmission channel 
between the CTC-operator and the station devices, 
therefore a simplified operational training is 
enough for them. 
Besides the temporary operators, the CTC-
operators should also be prepared regarding the 
unexpected emergency situations with numerous 
restrictions. The train controlled route setting 
function is disabled even if only one interlocking 
element fails. The CTC-operator has to temporary 
tolerate the higher workload and stress. Meanwhile 
his decisions have got serious effects on railway 
traffic; greater awareness is required to avoid 
leading the trains into a deadlock situation under 
the restricted conditions. Although the fall-back 
mode automation at the stations partially 
counteracts this situation, yet it is not absolutely 
impossible to occur, therefore the role of the CTC-
operators is indisputable. 
The appropriate education and training system 
can ensure the preparation of the CTC-operators. 
During theoretical education the correct procedures 
and the efficient strategies should be discussed, 
while applying operation simulation software, the 
principles can be practised and the workload can 
be examined by generating emergency situations. 
Since the availability of modern CTC systems is 
high enough, and the possibility of emergency 
situations is quite slight, the efforts into the 
preventive actions can be questioned. Nevertheless 
the serious consequences of the failures of the CTC 
functionality and the potential large scale of 
damages points at the important role of education 
and training. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented a complex solution 
on how to handle railway traffic in case of 
emergency situations. Since many types of failures 
can be raised concerning CTC systems, a fall-back 
mode operation is defined in order to maintain the 
traffic with less congestion. Considering technical 
aspects, a suitable CTC system architecture is 
described that distributes the functionality to 
different levels of traffic operation and execution. 
This structure ensures the station devices to work 
on even when the CTC centre or the data 
communication falls out. Besides that, the roles 
and responsibilities of the CTC personnel (centre, 
stations, train and troubleshooting staffs) are 
clarified and the proper proceedings under 
abnormal circumstances are determined. In 
connection with the human resources the 
importance of the education and training is 
emphasized. The main conclusion is that the fall-
back mode operation aided by technical solutions 
has to be harmonised with the concerning 
technological and human aspects. 
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